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We demonstrate that, with a fair comparison, the secret key rate of discrete-variable measurement-device-
independent quantum key distribution (DV-MDI-QKD) with high-efficiency single-photon detectors and good
system alignment is typically rather high and thus highly suitable for not only long distance communication
but also metropolitan networks. The previous reservation on the key rate and suitability of DV-MDI-QKD for
metropolitan networks expressed by Pirandola et al. [1] was based on an unfair comparison with low-efficiency
detectors and high quantum bit error rate, and is, in our opinion, unjustified.
In a recent Article in Nature Photonics, Pirandola et al. [1]
claim that the achievable secret key rates of discrete-variable
measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution
(DV-MDI-QKD) [2] are “typically very low, unsuitable for
the demands of a metropolitan network” and introduce a
continuous-variable (CV) MDI-QKD protocol capable of pro-
viding key rates which, they claim, are “three orders of mag-
nitude higher” than those of DV-MDI-QKD. We believe, how-
ever, that such statements are unjustified as they are based
on an unfair comparison between the two platforms. Here,
we show that, with a fair comparison, the secret key rate of
DV-MDI-QKD with high-efficiency single-photon detectors
(SPDs) and good system alignment is typically rather high
and thus highly suitable for not only long-distance communi-
cation but also metropolitan networks. The claimed very low
key rate of DV-MDI-QKD in [1] was due to a combination
of pessimistic assumptions of low-efficiency SPDs and rather
high quantum bit error rate (QBER).
It is well-known that CV-QKD could offer higher key rates
than DV-QKD at relatively short distances [3], while the exact
enhancement factor depends on technology. In their work, Pi-
randola et al. [1] consider nearly perfect devices for CV-MDI-
QKD (i.e., a relay with overall detection efficiency η = 98%
and an excess noise ε ' 0.01), but, rather surprisingly, use
low-performance off-the-shelf fiber-optical components with
η = 14.5% and QBER = 2.94% (which corresponds to the
misalignment error of 1.5% assumed in [2]) for DV-MDI-
QKD. Such comparison is unfair as it ignores the existence of
high-efficiency SPDs (η = 93% [4]) and much lower achieved
QBER (0.25% [5]), which could easily be used in DV-MDI-
QKD. In addition, they evaluate the most favourable case for
CV-MDI-QKD with a relay located very close to the sender
(see Fig. 5d in ref. [1]), which is not necessarily the case in a
real network. In doing so, it is not surprising that the enhance-
ment factor is noteworthy.
Here, we would like to point out that the situation changes
significantly with better SPDs [4] and lower QBER [5] in
DV-MDI-QKD. For CV-MDI-QKD, we use the same opti-
mistic assumptions on the experimental parameters employed
in ref. [1]. We first consider the highly asymmetric case where
the relay is placed very close to one of the users, Alice, so that
there is no channel loss between Alice and the relay. Figs. 1a
and 1b illustrate this scenario in the asymptotic limit of an in-
finitely long key (see Appendices for further details). In this
case, at a typical metropolitan distance (say 20 km of standard
telecom fiber of loss 0.2 dB/km used as an example in [1]),
the key rate of DV-MDI-QKD is about 0.02 bits/use, which
is actually quite high (i.e., approximately two orders of mag-
nitude away from the fundamental limit [6]) and suitable for
metropolitan networks. Moreover, this result is only slightly
lower but comparable to that of CV-MDI-QKD. Notice that,
even in this asymmetric case, the advantage in key rate of CV-
MDI-QKD is less than one order of magnitude for total system
loss beyond about only 2.5 dB.
In a general network, it is quite likely that a relay is far
away from both users. In the symmetric case where the re-
lay is placed in the middle between them, we see that DV-
MDI-QKD compares favorably with CV-MDI-QKD. This is
illustrated in Figs. 1c and 1d (see Appendices for further de-
tails). As shown there, while the key rate of DV-MDI-QKD
is still about 0.02 bits/use at 20 km of telecom fiber, the key
rate of CV-MDI-QKD drops to zero at already about 6.25 km.
Indeed, due to optical fiber loss the maximum distance of CV-
MDI-QKD is already limited to about 7.6 km (1.52 dB) [1].
Note that the performance of a network with arbitrary con-
figuration will be between the asymmetric and the symmetric
cases.
It is worthy to mention as well several practical challenges
associated with CV-MDI-QKD. First, the outstanding exper-
imental data from ref. [1] comes from a proof-of-principle
demonstration where Alice and Bob are very close to each
other, thus bypassing one of the major experimental chal-
lenges in CV-MDI-QKD implementations—establishing a re-
liable phase reference between two spatially separated users.
Note that the Bell state measurement of DV-MDI-QKD is
insensitive to phase noise [5], thus much easier to imple-
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FIG. 1: Secret key rate of DV-MDI-QKD (green dashed line) versus CV-MDI-QKD (blue solid line). For the former we consider η = 93% [4],
QBER= 0.25% [5], and an error correction inefficiency factor of 1.16. For the later we use experimental parameters from ref. [1] (i.e.,
η = 98%, ε ' 0.01, and reconciliation efficiency ξ = 0.97). a, Asymmetric scenario with a relay located close to Alice. The solid blue
line corresponds to Fig. 5d(i) in ref. [1]. We see that the advantage in key rate of CV-MDI-QKD is less than one order of magnitude for total
system loss beyond about only 2.5 dB. b, A zoom-in of a for the low loss regime. c, Symmetric scenario with a relay placed in the middle
of the users. This result seems to indicate that CV-MDI-QKD is unsuitable for applications in a symmetric case as the key rate drops to zero
at already about 1.25 dB. Indeed, due to optical fiber loss the maximum distance of CV-MDI-QKD is already limited to about 7.6 km (1.52
dB) [1]. d, As in b, but now referred to c.
ment. Second, coupling losses and state-of-the-art homodyne
detectors could render it difficult to achieve η = 98% for
fiber-based CV-MDI-QKD communications at telecom wave-
lengths (e.g., η is about 60% in ref. [7]). Third, in the realistic
finite-key length regime, current composable security proofs
against general attacks for CV-QKD with coherent states seem
to fall short on providing useful finite-size key estimates [8].
This strongly contrasts with DV-MDI-QKD [9]. Finally, if
one considers the key rate per second, currently the high rep-
etition rate of DV-QKD (i.e., 1 GHz [10]) versus CV-QKD
(i.e., 1 MHz [7]) means that DV-QKD has an advantage in
this regard.
All these factors combine to lead us to conclude that, con-
trary to the claims of Pirandola et al. [1], DV-MDI-QKD has
a high key rate and is highly versatile and suitable for most
metropolitan network configurations. Moreover, experimen-
tal DV-MDI-QKD has already been done even at a distance
of 200 km over telecom fibers [5]. CV-MDI-QKD has the
potential for applications in some (e.g., highly asymmetric)
metropolitan network configurations, but fares poorly in a
symmetric network setting when a relay is far away from both
users. Furthermore, a number of challenges including finite-
key analysis with composable security, establishing a reliable
phase reference between two remote users and low repetition
rate need to be overcome before CV-MDI-QKD can be se-
curely deployed in practice.
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Appendix A: DV-MDI-QKD
Here, we present the detailed models that we use for the
numerical simulations of DV-MDI-QKD shown in Fig. 1.
The secure key rate of decoy-state DV-MDI-QKD in the
3asymptotic limit of an infinitely long key is given by [2]
RDV = p
Z
11Y
Z
11[1−H2(eX11)]−QZfe(EZ)H2(EZ), (A1)
where pZ11 = µAµBe
−(µA+µB) denotes the joint probabil-
ity that both Alice and Bob generate a single-photon pulse,
and with µA and µB being, respectively, the intensity of Al-
ice and Bob’s signal states; the parameters Y Z11 and e
X
11 are,
respectively, the yield in the rectilinear (Z) basis and the er-
ror rate in the diagonal (X) basis, given that both Alice and
Bob send single-photon states; H2(x) = −x log2 (x) − (1 −
x) log2 (1− x) is the binary Shannon entropy function; the
terms QZ and EZ denote, respectively, the overall gain and
quantum bit error rate (QBER) in the Z basis when both Al-
ice and Bob emit a signal state; and fe(EZ) ≥ 1 is the error
correction inefficiency function.
The quantities QZ and EZ are directly measured in the ex-
periment, while Y Z11 and e
X
11 can be estimated using the decoy-
state method [11]. Importantly, it has been shown that the use
of two decoy states is already enough to obtain a tight estima-
tion for Y Z11 and e
X
11 [12].
To model experimental errors, we employ the method
proposed in ref. [11] for polarisation encoding DV-MDI-
QKD [13, 14]. See also refs. [15, 16] for alternative models
suitable for time-bin encoding systems [17, 18]. In particular,
we use two unitary operators, located at the input arms of the
beamsplitter within the relay (see Appendix B in ref. [11]),
to simulate the intrinsic error rate, denoted as ed, due to the
misalignment and instability of the optical system. In addi-
tion, we consider threshold SPDs with detection efficiency ηd
and dark count rate Y0. Furthermore, for simplicity, we con-
sider the asymptotic case where Alice and Bob use an infinite
number of decoy states. As already mentioned, the practical
situation with a finite number of decoy settings provides sim-
ilar results [12]. In this scenario, we have that the parameters
Y Z11 and e
X
11 have the form [11]
Y Z11 = (1− Y0)2
[
4Y 20 (1− ηAηd)(1− ηBηd)
+ 2Y0
(
ηAηd + ηBηd − 3
2
ηAηBη
2
d
)
+
1
2
ηAηBη
2
d
]
,
eX11 =
1
2
− (1− Y0)
2ηAηBη
2
d(1− ed)2
4Y X11
, (A2)
where ηA (ηB) denotes the channel transmittance from Alice
(Bob) to the relay. That is, ηA = 10−αlA/10, where α is the
loss coefficient of the channel that connects Alice with the
relay measured in dB/km, and lA is the length of this channel
measured in km. The definition of ηB is analogous. Moreover,
we have that Y X11 = Y
Z
11.
For simulation purposes only, we use the value of QZ and
EZ provided in Appendix B of ref. [11]. For completeness,
we include the mathematical expressions below. In particular,
QZ =
1
2
(Ω1 + Ω2) , (A3)
EZ =
Ω1
Ω1 + Ω2
,
where the parameters Ω1 and Ω2 are given by
Ω1 = 2e
− γ2 (1− Y0)2
[
I0(β) + I0(β − 2βed) (A4)
+ 2(1− Y0)2e−
γ
2 − 2(1− Y0)e−
γ(1−ed)
2 I0(edβ)
− 2(1− Y0)e−
γed
2 I0(β − edβ)
]
,
Ω2 = 2e
− γ2 (1− Y0)2
[
1 + I0(2λ) + 2(1− Y0)2e−
γ
2
− 2(1− Y0)e−ω2 I0(λ)− 2(1− Y0)e−
γ−ω
2 I0(λ)
]
,
with I0(x) being the modified Bessel function, and where
γ = (µAηA + µBηB)ηd, (A5)
β = ηd
√
µAµBηAηB,
λ = β
√
ed(1− ed),
ω = µAηAηd + ed(µBηB − µAηA)ηd.
ηd ed Y0 fe(E
Z)
93% [4] 0.1% [5] 10−6 [4] 1.16 [19]
TABLE I: Experimental parameters considered in DV-MDI-QKD.
In our simulation, we employ the experimental parameters
shown in Table I. That is, we consider high-efficiency WSi
superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs)
with ηd = 93% and Y0 = 10−6 (per pulse) [4], and as-
sume an intrinsic error rate ed = 0.1% (which corresponds
to the QBER of 0.25% obtained in the 200 km DV-MDI-
QKD experiment reported in ref. [5]). In addition, we use
fe(E
Z) = 1.16 [19]. The resulting lower bound on the secret
key rate RDV given by Eq. (A1) is illustrated in Fig. 1 in the
main text, where we have numerically optimised the values of
the intensities µA and µB. That is, for a given total system
loss, we use a Monte Carlo simulation method to select the
value of µA and µB such that RDV is maximum.
To conclude this section, let us emphasise that the high-
efficiency SNSPDs reported in ref. [4] have been already suc-
cessfully applied in various recent QKD demonstrations such
as high-dimensional QKD [20, 21] and a proof-of-principle
demonstration of DV-MDI-QKD [22].
Appendix B: CV-MDI-QKD
In this Appendix we present the detailed models that we
use for the numerical simulations of CV-MDI-QKD shown in
Fig. 1.
To evaluate the secure key rate of CV-MDI-QKD we follow
Section E from the Supplementary Information of ref. [1]. We
have that the general expression of the key rate formula has
the form
RCV = ξIAB − IE, (B1)
where ξ is the reconciliation efficiency of the error correction
code, and IAB and IE denote, respectively, Alice and Bob’s
4mutual information and Eve’s stolen information on Alice’s
key.
To derive an explicit formula for the secret key rate given
by Eq. (B1), Pirandola et al. [1] consider a “realistic Gaussian
attack against the two links”, which definitively provides an
upper bound on the secure key rate. Here, we assume the
most favourable situation for CV-MDI-QKD by considering
that such realistic Gaussian attack is indeed optimal and the
resulting key rate is achievable. In doing so, we have that the
quantity IAB can be expressed as [1]
IAB = log2
(
φ+ 1
χ
)
, (B2)
where φ is the modulation variance in shot-noise units and χ
represents the so-called equivalent noise.
Moreover, for simplicity, we consider the key rate in the
limit of large modulation (φ  1). In this scenario, and con-
sidering first the asymmetric case ηA 6= ηB, we have that IE is
given by [1]
IE = h(β) + log2(γ)− h(δ), (B3)
where the parameters β, γ and δ have the form
β =
ηAηBχ− (ηA + ηB)2
|ηA − ηB|(ηA + ηB)
γ =
e|ηA − ηB|(φ+ 1)
2(ηA + ηB)
δ =
ηAχ− (ηA + ηB)
ηA + ηB
. (B4)
Here, the term e denotes Euler’s number, and the equivalent
noise χ is given by
χ =
2(ηA + ηB)
ηAηBηd
+ ε, (B5)
with ε being the excess noise. Finally, the function h(x),
which appears in Eq. (B3), has the form
h(x) =
(
x+ 1
2
)
log2
(
x+ 1
2
)
−
(
x− 1
2
)
log2
(
x− 1
2
)
.
In the symmetric case where ηA = ηB = η, we have that
IE is given by [1]
IE = log2
(
e2(χ− 4)(φ+ 1)
16
)
− h
(χ
2
− 1
)
, (B6)
where the equivalent noise χ has now the form
χ =
4
ηηd
+ ε. (B7)
In the simulation shown in Fig. 1 in the main text, we con-
sider the same experimental parameters used in ref. [1]. They
are illustrated in Table II.
ηd ε φ ξ
98% 0.01 60 0.97
TABLE II: Experimental parameters considered in CV-MDI-
QKD [1].
Appendix C: TGM bound
The secret key rates obtained in the previous sections can
be compared with the fundamental upper bound (per optical
mode) for coherent-state QKD provided in ref. [6] (so-called
TGW bound). This bound has the form
RTGW = log2
(
1 + ηAηB
1− ηAηB
)
. (C1)
It can be shown, for instance, that at a typical metropolitan dis-
tance (say 20 km of standard telecom fiber of loss 0.2 dB/km
used as an example in [1]), the key rate of DV-MDI-QKD is
approximately two orders of magnitude away from this fun-
damental limit.
Appendix D: Source requirements in CV-MDI-QKD
Here, we briefly discuss challenges associated with the state
preparation process in CV-MDI-QKD.
As already mentioned in the main text, the experimental
configuration using one laser feeding two closely spaced Al-
ice and Bob on the optical table bypasses one of the major
experimental challenges in CV-MDI-QKD, namely, establish-
ing a reliable phase reference between two remote users. Even
if a common laser is used for both Alice and Bob, distributing
phase-stable signals over fibre to two remote sites can still be
a practical challenge.
Furthermore, it is important to emphasise that one funda-
mental assumption in MDI-QKD is that Eve cannot interfere
with Alice and Bob’s state preparation processes [2]. To jus-
tify the above assumption, DV-MDI-QKD is commonly im-
plemented by using independent laser sources for Alice and
Bob. However, since the proof-of-principle demonstration in
ref. [1] uses a common laser source for both of them, this
might open the door for side-channel attacks on quantum state
preparation. This is because at least one of the users has to en-
code information on untrusted laser pulses accessible by Eve.
Pirandola et al. [1] discussed several potential solutions to
the above problems in the Supplementary Information. How-
ever, none of them has been implemented in ref. [1].
Appendix E: Addendum
In this Appendix, we comment on a recent reply by Piran-
dola et al. [23] to this paper. In particular,
1. Pirandola et al. agree with our main point.
First of all, it is important to note that in their reply Piran-
dola et al. [23] agree with our main point. That is to say that,
5contrary to the statements in their Nature Photonics paper [1],
the secret key rate of DV-MDI-QKD with high-efficiency
SPDs and good system alignment is sufficiently high for not
only long distance communication but also metropolitan net-
works. In fact, at metropolitan distances (say 20 km or more)
in telecom fibers (with a loss of 0.2 dB/km at 1550 nm wave-
length), the key rate of DV-MDI-QKD is only approximately
two orders of magnitude away from the fundamental limit set
by the TGW bound [6].
The validity of this main point relies mainly on the exis-
tence of high-efficiency SPDs at telecom wavelengths, which
not only have been used by a few research groups in the world
in different recent experiments [4, 20–22, 24], but also are
already commercially available [25, 26]. These detector sys-
tems have “fully-automated closed-cycle cryostats that deliver
temperatures below 1K without the consumption and running
expense of liquid helium” [25].
Most importantly, note that our main point holds indepen-
dently of the performance of CV-MDI-QKD [1]. For com-
pleteness, however, below we address some other side points
raised by Pirandola et al. in [23].
2. Experimental results of CV-MDI-QKD done in
free-space, at a non-telecom wavelength, and using non-
telecom detectors cannot and should not be used as a
demonstration of telecom CV-MDI-QKD performance.
In [1], Pirandola et al. performed a table-top free-space ex-
periment using a single laser at a wavelength of 1064 nm that
lies far away from the telecom band. Experimental results
obtained under such conditions, however commendable, can-
not be used to make quantitative statements about a realistic
CV-MDI-QKD experiment that would be carried out in fiber
using two remotely located, independent, lasers at a telecom
wavelength (say 1550 nm) using telecom photodetectors.
As will be discussed below in a point-by-point manner (see
Points 5 & 6), we find such attempts to infer results from en-
tirely different experimental platforms and conditions inap-
propriate and misleading.
3. CV-MDI-QKD could have an advantage over DV-
MDI-QKD only under rather restrictive conditions.
We do not deny that CV-MDI-QKD might have an advan-
tage over DV-MDI-QKD, but only in a rather restrictive pa-
rameter space where a combination of assumptions/conditions
are simultaneously satisfied, namely, (i) asymptotic key rate
for an infinitely long key; (ii) high-efficiency (well above
85%) homodyne detectors, (iii) highly asymmetric configu-
ration where the relay is close to one of the two users, Alice
or Bob; and (iv) low loss (i.e., short distance).
We encourage serious and careful future theoretical and ex-
perimental research in CV-MDI-QKD to address the above
relevant challenges. However, it is important to put things in
perspective and understand the nature of these relevant chal-
lenges now.
4. For CV-QKD with coherent states, practical compos-
able secure key rates against the most general type of at-
tacks have yet to be shown.
It is important to clearly emphasise as well that the only rel-
evant practical comparison between DV-MDI-QKD and CV-
MDI-QKD is in the realistic finite-key setting scenario (not in
the unrealistic infinitely long key situation). In this respect,
Pirandola et al. [23] confuse the restricted class of collec-
tive attacks with the most general class of coherent attacks.
Indeed, CV-QKD can produce composable secure key rates
against collective attacks with a reasonable amount of signals
distributed between Alice and Bob [8]. Unfortunately, how-
ever, current security proofs against the most general type of
coherent attacks for CV-QKD with coherent states deliver ba-
sically zero key rate for any reasonable amount of signals [8].
Indeed, as already noted in a recent review on CV-QKD, com-
posable security against coherent attacks “has yet to be shown
with coherent states” (see line 2 of the first paragraph of p. 10
of [27]).
This strongly contrasts with DV-MDI-QKD, which can pro-
duce relatively high key rates composable secure against gen-
eral attacks [9]. Also, note that, in this scenario, the minimum
number of signals that Alice and Bob need to distribute de-
pends on the transmittance of the system. For instance, it can
be shown that when the detection efficiency of the relay is say
η = 14.5%, the minimum number of signals is about 1010,
while for η = 55% (η = 93%) this number is 109 (108) sig-
nals [9]. In short, in reality, against the most general type of
attacks, current finite-key security proofs provide basically no
key rate for CV-MDI-QKD but deliver a relatively high key
for DV-MDI-QKD.
This being said, from now on we relax this assumption and
consider the asymptotic key rate in the limit of infinitely long
keys.
5. The critical dependence of CV-MDI-QKD key rates
on homodyne detection efficiency is down played by Piran-
dola et al.
The performance of fiber-based CV-MDI-QKD depends
crucially on the value of the detection efficiency of homodyne
detectors at telecom wavelengths. This is because, in an MDI-
QKD setting, the relay cannot be assumed to be honest and its
detection efficiency can be fully exploited by Eve. Therefore,
the difference between η = 98% and η = 80% can make or
break the system.
For instance, the key rate (even in the asymptotic limit) of
CV-MDI-QKD [1] is basically zero when η < 85%, while
DV-MDI-QKD can in principle tolerate about 40 dB loss [2].
Figs. 2a and 2b show the key rate of CV-MDI-QKD for several
values of η > 85%. These figures highlight the dramatical
performance decrease of CV-MDI-QKD even when η is as
high as 90%. Pirandola et al. [1, 23] use η = 98% for all
the graphics that illustrate the key rate of CV-MDI-QKD. For
this, they argue that [23] “CV Bell detections routinely reach
very high efficiencies, as typical in many experiments [28–31]
(η = 98% in our setup)”. Unfortunately, neither the detectors
in their setup nor the ones in the references provided were
fiber-coupled or in telecom wavelength.
In addition, they claim [23] that “in a fibre-optic implemen-
tation of the protocol, coupling efficiency to a fibre can be as
high as 98-99% and the quantum efficiency of photo-detectors
can be >99%, with an overall efficiency of about 97-98%.”
Unfortunately again, Pirandola et al. [23] seem to have ig-
nored the difference between “can be” and “is”. While there is
no fundamental limit for detectors to reach 97-98% efficiency,
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FIG. 2: Secret key rate of CV-MDI-QKD in the asymptotic limit of infinitely long keys for different values of η > 85%. Like in Fig. 1, we
consider ε ' 0.01, and a reconciliation efficiency ξ = 0.97. a, Asymmetric scenario with a relay located close to Alice. b, Symmetric scenario
with a relay placed in the middle of the users. The blue lines correspond to the cases illustrated in Fig. 1 (i.e., η = 98%). The key rate of
CV-MDI-QKD is basically zero when η < 85% both for the asymmetric and symmetric configurations. This figure highlights the dramatical
performance decrease of CV-MDI-QKD even when η is as high as 90%.
most commercial off-the-shelf fiber-coupled detectors for the
telecom wavelength have responsivities less than 1 A/W. This
number translates into a detection efficiency at 1550 nm of
η < 80%, which is well below the minimum efficiency of
about 85% required in CV-MDI-QKD.
6. Pirandola et al.’s free-space experiment is not a prop-
erly designed QKD demonstration, thus the results shown
in Fig. 1 are all “purely-numerical”.
In addition, one might want to point out that the experiment
reported in [1] is not a properly designed QKD demonstration,
thus it is not appropriate to compare such result with lab and
field fiber-based experiments [5, 13, 14, 17, 18, 32] in com-
plete DV-MDI-QKD over practical distance at all. This is so,
because:
1. One single laser: As already mentioned in the main text
(see also Appendix D), the experiment in [1] uses one
laser (with Alice and Bob very close to each other) to
mimic two independent lasers, thus bypassing the chal-
lenge of establishing a phase reference between two re-
mote lasers, and therefore results in much less excess
noise than would be expected had they used two inde-
pendent lasers.
In this regard, Pirandola et al. [23] claim that “in-
terfering signals from independent laser sources is no
longer a security issue or major experimental challenge
in CV-QKD” due to the recent developments in [33, 34].
While it is true that a potential solution to this prob-
lem has been proposed recently, note that this solution
has not been implemented in [1] nor the additional ex-
pected phase noise has been considered in the simula-
tions shown in refs. [1, 23].
2. Table-top experiment at a wavelength outside the tele-
com band: It is a table-top experiment conducted at
1064 nm through free-space. To use results obtained
this way and plot the key rate as a function of the dis-
tance (not loss) assuming 0.2 dB/km loss in fiber, as
done in Fig. 5d [1] and in Fig.1 [23], is entirely inap-
propriate. The loss in fiber at 1064 nm is approximately
1.5 dB/km. In fact, 1064 nm is shorter than the cut-off
wavelength of the standard telecom fiber, meaning that
the fiber does not support single mode propagation at
1064 nm.
3. Incorrect noise model: Pirandola et al. [23] claim that
“Finally, the excess noise in the experiment (≈ 0.01)
is not low but typical (e.g., it is 0.008 in [7]).” This is
simply incorrect.
In CV-QKD, there are two major contributions to the
overall excess noise: (i) the phase noise in coherent de-
tection (which can also include noise in state prepara-
tion), and (ii) the electrical noise of the detector. In
ref. [7], the electrical noise itself is already 0.015, al-
most twice as the value of 0.008 interpreted in [23].
The reasons to observe a so small excess noise (≈ 0.01)
in the experiment reported in [1] are, in our opinion,
mainly two. First, the use of one single laser over a
very short distance (see Point 6.1), thus the phase noise
can be minimised. Second, the information provided
in the supplementary material of [1] suggests that the
bandwidth of the homodyne detectors could be rela-
tively small. In this condition, such results cannot be
directly translated to high-speed CV-MDI-QKD.
In this regard, we would like to point out that the results
shown in Fig. 1 are all “purely-numerical”. In particular, we
consider a quite favourable scenario for CV-MDI-QKD by as-
suming that: (i) a reliable phase relation can be established
between two remote lasers without introducing any noise; and
(ii) the loss of fiber coupling (required for fiber-based QKD)
or for a free-space optical receiver (required in free-space
QKD) is zero. Both assumptions are probably over-optimistic,
so one might expect that the secure key rate of a complete
7practical implementation of CV-MDI-QKD, when it is done,
could be lower than that illustrated in Fig. 1. In this sense, the
lack of a CV-MDI-QKD demonstration that addresses all the
points mentioned in this Appendix renders it difficult to make
a “fair” comparison between both platforms.
7. CV-MDI-QKD could be suitable only for particular
network architectures.
Suppose a metropolitan network architecture with several
users connected to a single relay (e.g., see Fig. 9 in ref. [35]).
Due to the limited performance of symmetric CV-MDI-QKD,
to guarantee that all users can communicate with each other
(without trusting any user in the network), note that most of
them (but one) should be located relatively close to the relay.
8. Final remarks.
To conclude, we reply briefly to the statements that Piran-
dola et al. [23] consider that are incorrect in our manuscript.
In particular,
1. “The experimental rate of [1] is not an upper bound but
a lower bound” [23]: Our manuscript does not claim
that the experimental rate of [1] is an upper bound.
2. “The theoretical rate of [1] is optimal” [23]: Note that
Fig. 1 already assumes that the theoretical rate of [1] is
optimal. This being said, we admit that it was unclear
to us whether or not the “realistic Gaussian attack” con-
sidered in [1] to derive the theoretical rate was indeed
optimal, or if it provided an upper bound on the theoret-
ical rate. So, in our simulations we opted for the most
favourable case for CV-MDI-QKD by considering that
the attack is optimal (see Appendix B). We are glad to
see that Pirandola et al. [23] confirm this.
3. “Finite-size effects [3, 36, 37] and composable secu-
rity [8] support our experimental results” [23]: This
statement is simply incorrect. See Point 4 above.
4. “The relay doesn’t need to be in Alices lab” [23]: Our
manuscript does not claim that the relay needs to be in-
side Alice’s lab; in Fig. 1 we evaluate this case only be-
cause it is the most favourable one for CV-MDI-QKD.
5. “Interfering signals from independent laser sources is
no longer a security issue or major experimental chal-
lenge in CV-QKD” [23]: See Point 6 above.
6. “Fast time-resolved homodyne detectors are available
with bandwidths of 100MHz and more” [23]: None of
the references provided by Pirandola et al. [23] to sup-
port this statement are at telecom wavelengths, or have
sufficiently high detection efficiency to deliver a signif-
icant key rate for CV-MDI-QKD. Also, note that our
statement in the main text about 1 MHz CV-QKD sim-
ply reflects the state-of-the-art of current clock rates for
complete CV-QKD systems [7], rather than the band-
width of homodyne detectors.
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